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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -MOOTNESS -PERSONAL STAKE-CLASS
ACTIONS-The United States Supreme Court has held that an action
brought on behalf of a class may be appealed upon expiration of the
named plaintiffs substantive claim even though the class certification
has been denied.
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois,1 John M. Geraghty was convicted of con-
spiracy to commit extortion through the use of his official position as a
Chicago vice squad police officer,2 and of making false declarations to a
jury.3 On January 25, 1974, Geraghty was sentenced to concurrent
terms of four years imprisonment on the conspiracy count and one
year imprisonment on the false declaration count.' On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
convictions.5 Pursuant to a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 35,8 Geraghty obtained a reduction of his sentence to thirty
months.7
In Janauary 1976, and again in June 1976, Geraghty applied for
release on parole. The Board of Parole denied both parole applications,8
relying on the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act' and the
1. See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 390, 391 (1980).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
3. See ic. § 1623.
4. 445 U.S. at 392. See 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (1976).
5. United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 910
(1975).
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 provides:
The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of
sentence. The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is
imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon af-
firmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after entry
of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court denying review of, or having the
effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction. The court may also reduce a sentence
upon revocation of probation as provided by law.
7. United States v. Braasch, No. 72 C.R. 979 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 9, 1975), appeal dis-
missed and mandamus denied, 542 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1976). The motion was granted
because, in the district court's view, application of the United States Parole Board's
Parole Release Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942-39,145 (1973) (currently in force at 28
C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979)), would frustrate the sentencing judge's intent with regard to the
length of time Geraghty would serve in prison. Id.
8. 445 U.S. at 392.
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976).
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guidelines promulgated thereunder by the Commission."0 The
guidelines, as applied to Geraghty, did not permit release until service
of his entire sentence minus good-time credits."
On September 15, 1976, Geraghty brought a class action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge
the validity of the Parole Release Guidelines.12 Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B), 1 Geraghty sought certification of a
class of all federal prisoners who are or will become eligible for release
on parole." Without deciding the certification motion, the court
transferred the action to the United States District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Pennsylvania, the district where Geraghty was in-
carcerated.1 5
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania subse-
quently denied Geraghty's request for class certification and granted
summary judgment for the United States Parole Commission. 16 The
district court held that rule 23 was not applicable to a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus because the issues raised were not applicable to
all the members of the class and not all members of the class had the
same interests as Geraghty in declaring the Parole Commission act un-
constitutional.1 7 Turning to the merits of Geraghty's claim, the district
10. 28 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1976). These guidelines, in accordance with statutory criteria, are
to be used in making parole decisions. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(al requires the decision to be based
upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history and
characteristics of the prisoner. See Conference Report, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 359.
11. 445 U.S. at 392.
12. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, Civil No. 76-1729 (D.D.C., November
12, 1976).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) provides in relevant part:
An action may be maintained as a class action if...
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not par-
ties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect
their interests ....
14. 445 U.S. at 393.
15. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, Civil No. 76-1729 (D.D.C., November
12, 1976). The District Court for the District of Columbia construed the action as a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus, which must be brought in the district where the prisoner is
incarcerated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (1976). The court transferred the action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1406 which allows a district court in the interest of justice to transfer a case
laying in the wrong venue to any district court in which it could have been brought. Id
16. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 429 F. Supp. 737 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
17. Id. at 740-41.
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court concluded that the Act and the guidelines were not unconstitu-
tional.' 8
Geraghty, individually and on behalf of a class, appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.' 9 Thereafter, a
prisoner named Becher who also had been denied release through ap-
plication of the guidelines, moved to intervene to insure that the legal
issues raised by Geraghty on behalf of the class would not escape ap-
pellate review.20 The district court denied the petition to intervene,
concluding that Geraghty's notice of appeal had divested the court of
jurisdiction. Geraghty's and Becher's appeals were consolidated.2 '
On June 30, 1977, while appeal was pending, Geraghty was man-
datorily released from prison.' The Parole Commission then sought
dismissal of the appeal on the basis that Geraghty's claim was moot.
The court of appeals reserved decision on the motion until considera-
tion of the merits.
In reversing the district court's decision, the appeals court held that
Geraghty's release from prison would not have rendered the case moot
if a class had been certified,' and, therefore, an erroneous denial of
certification should not lead to an opposite result. 5 The court held that
plaintiff is not required to prove that certification is necessary, but on-
ly that there is compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.n
The court of appeals also questioned the trial court's finding that class
certification was inappropriate. According to the appellate court, the
trial court failed to exercise its discretion to limit an overbroad class
by the use of sub-classes.Y Concluding that the trial court erred by fail-
ing to consider the possibility of creating sub-classes, the court of ap-
peals reversed and remanded.5
18. Id at 741-44. The court found Geraghty's argument that the Act empowered the
Parole Commission to make deferred sentencing decisions without proper due process
safeguards and in violation of the ex post facto prohibition to be without merit because
parole involves the implementation, not the modification, of a sentence. Id.
19. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated
and remanded, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
20. 445 U.S. at 394.
21. Id.
22. Id. Geraghty was released after serving 22 months of his 30 month sentence, hav-
ing earned good-time credits for the remaining 8 months. Id. See notes 6 and 7 and accom-
panying text supra.
23. 445 U.S. at 394.
24. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
25. 579 F.2d at 248-52.
26. Id. at 252.
27. Id. at 252-53.
28. Id.
1981
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether a trial court's denial of a motion for class certification may be
reviewed on appeal after the named plaintiffs personal claim has ex-
pired." In delivering the opinion of the court," Justice Blackmun first
discussed the case or controversy limitation which article III of the
Constitution places on the judiciary.3' The case or controversy require-
ment limits the business of federal courts to issues framed in an adver-
sarial context, and defines the role of the judiciary in order to main-
tain the separation of powers2 2 The Court noted that the doctrine of
mootness has two corresponding requirements: that an issue be live,
and that a party have a personal stake in the outcome of the
litigation."
After finding a live controversy between the defendant and at least
some of the class members," the Court turned to the second aspect of
mootness, the personal stake of the parties in the litigation." Narrow-
ing its analysis to the class action context,8 the Court discussed Sosna
v. Iowa" which established that an article III controversy can exist
between a defendant and members of a class represented by a named
plaintiff whose personal claim has become moot.' Although in Sosna
the mootness of the class representative's individual claim occurred
after class certification, the Court explained that other cases applying
a relation-back approach have demonstrated that the timing of class
certification is not crucial. 9 For instance, if a claim on the merits is
29. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 440 U.S. 945 (1979).
30. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court joined by Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Stevens. Justice Powell dissented and filed an opinion in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, states in part: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution ... to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party; ... to Controversies between two or more States ... 
32. 445 U.S. at 396. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
33. 445 U.S. at 396-97.
34. Id. at 396. According to the Court, this element was satisfied because prisoners
currently affected by the guidelines have moved to be substituted, or to intervene, as
class representatives. I&
35. Id.
36. Id. at 397.
37. 419 U.S. 393 (1975). In Sosna the petitioner had filed for a divorce in Iowa shortly
after moving there from New York. The divorce proceeding was dismissed for failure to
meet Iowa's one-year residence requirement. The suit was certified pursuant to rule
23(c)(1) as a class action. However, the suit failed on the merits. Prior to Supreme Court
review, the petitioner satisfied the residence requirement and had obtained a divorce.
38. Id. at 400.
39. 445 U.S. at 398. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 (1975) (pretrial
custody is by its nature temporary and it is unlikely that an individual could have a con-
stitutional claim decided on appeal before his release); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117
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capable of repetition, yet evading review, the named plaintiff may
litigate the class certification issue despite a loss of personal stake in
the litigation. 0 Because the litigant faces some likelihood of becoming
involved in the same controversy in the future, vigorous advocacy can
be expected to continue. 1 The Court noted that even where the named
plaintiffs expressed claim will not reoccur, a claim may be so inherent-
ly transitory that a court will not have time to decide the certification
issue before the named plaintiffs interest expires."' The Court noted
that this reasoning was applied in Gerstein v. Pugh"3 to hold a class
challenge to pretrial detention conditions not to be moot even though
the named plaintiffs were no longer in pretrial custody and there was
no indication that the named plaintiffs might again be subject to
pretrial custody." The Court in Gerstein reasoned that there was not
time for certification and the constant existence of a class suffering
deprivation remained certain.
5
The Court next focused on two contexts in which it has held that a
proposed class representative who proceeds to a judgment on the
merits may appeal a denial of class certification. First, in Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay'" the Court held that a denial of class certification
may not be immediately appealed, reasoning that a denial of certifica-
tion is not necessarily the "death knell"'7 of the action because there
remains the chance that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits and will
have the certification denial reversed on appeal. 8 Second, in United
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald' the Court held that a putative class
member may intervene to obtain appellate review of class certification
denial after the named plaintiffs' claims have been satisfied and judg-
(1973) (natural termination of plaintiffs pregnancy does not make a case moot because a
pregnancy will seldom continue beyond the trial stage; therefore, review would be denied
if mootness were found).
40. 445 U.S. at 398. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Southern Pac. Ter-
minal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
41. 445 U.S. at 398. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. 445 U.S. at 399.
43. 420 U.S. 103, 110-11 n.11 (1974).
44. 445 U.S. at 399.
45. 420 U.S. at 110-11 n.11. The Gerstein Court noted that the attorney representing
the class was the public defender, and it was safe to assume he had other clients with con-
tinuing live interests. Id
46. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
47. "The 'death knell' doctrine assumed that without the incentive of a possible group
recovery the individual plaintiff may find it economically imprudent to pursue his lawsuit
to a final judgment and then seek appellate review of an adverse class determination." Id
at 469.
48. Id at 469-71.
49. 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
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ment entered in their favor." The Geraghty majority noted that the
underlying rationale in McDonald is that a refusal to certify a class is
subject to review after final judgment at the behest of the named
plaintiffs." The Court also pointed out that in the companion case to
Geraghty, Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper," it held that the
named plaintiffs may appeal denial of class certification where their
claims are satisfied over their objection." According to the Court,
Gerstein, McDonald, and Roper are all examples of cases which were
found not be be moot despite the loss of a personal stake in the merits
by the proposed class representative."
Responding to the Parole Commission's argument that Roper can be
distinguished because expiration of a claim is entirely different from a
judgment on the claim,5 the Court found no persuasive distinction. The
Court stated that just as a confession of judgment on less than all the
issues does not preclude an appeal of remaining issues,'5 neither does
the mootness of the named plaintiff's substantive claim due to an oc-
currence other than a judgment moot all other issues in the case. 7 The
Court reasoned that a plaintiff who brings a class action presents two
issues for judicial resolution: the claim on the merits and the claim of
entitlement to represent a class. To determine whether the plaintiff
may continue to press a class certification claim after the claim on the
merits expires, the Court examined the personal stake in a class cer-
tification claim. 8 The Court reasoned that a legally cognizable interest
in the traditional sense rarely exists in a class certification claim."
However, because of the justifications6' and benefits of the class action
50. Id. at 392-95.
51. 445 U.S. at 400. See 432 U.S. at 393.
52. 445 U.S. 326, 327-28 (1980). In Roper, credit card holders brought a class action
against a national bank alleging usurious charges under Mississippi law. The trial court
denied certification and plaintiffs appealed. The petitioner tendered to each respondent
the amount that each would have recovered, but respondents refused to accept tender.
The district court, over the respondents' objections, entered judgment in their favor and
dismissed the action. Id at 327-29.
53. 445 U.S. at 329.
54. Id
55. See Brief for Petitioners at 37-39, United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445
U.S. 388 (1980). The Commission argued that a party loses his adversary role after he has
obtained all the relief possible by the termination of the challenged conduct absent
adverse findings with any collateral significance. Id-
56. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. at 401-02.
57. 445 U.S. at 402.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).
60. "The justifications that led to the development of the class action include... the
protection of the interests of absentees, the provision of convenient and economical means
for disposing of similar lawsuits, and the facilitation of the spreading of litigation costs
Vol. 19:779
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device, the class representative has a right to have the class certified
if the requirements of rule 23 are met." According to the Court, this
right is more analogous to the private attorney general concept than
to the type of interest traditionally thought to satisfy the personal
stake requirement."
The Court concluded that a class certification claim remains as a
concrete, sharply presented issue even when the named plaintiffs
claim on the merits has expired." According to the Court, Sosna was
an implicit determination that vigorous advocacy can be assured
through means other than the traditional requirement of a personal
stake in the outcome."
The Court limited its holding to the appeal of the denial of class cer-
tification, stating that a class must be properly certified before a named
plaintiff whose claim expires can pursue an appeal on the merits." The
Court also pointed out that its conclusion that the controversy is not
moot does not automatically establish the named plaintiff's right to
continue litigating in the interests of the class. It only shifts the in-
quiry to the ability of the named representative to fairly and adequate-
ly protect the interests of the class." Turning to the class certification
determination, the Court determined that the court of appeals' remand
to the district court to consider the possibility of certifying sub-classes
did not place an undue burden on the district court. The Court noted,
however, that on remand the plaintiff has the burden of presenting
sub-class proposals.
7
Justice Powell, writing in dissent," maintained that the majority's
decision represents a significant departure from settled law." In a
three-part analysis, he first rejected the majority's interpretation of
the personal stake requirement as flexible. Justice Powell viewed the
among numerous litigants with similar claims." 445 U.S. at 403. See 28 U.S.C. app. R.23
(1976), Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rules.
61. 445 U.S. at 403.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. See note 37 supra. The Court noted that Geraghty continued to vigorously ad-
vocate the class certification issue. 445 U.S. at 404.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 406. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 403. See also Comment, A Search for
Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts: Part Two-Class Actions, 54 TExAs L.
Rnv. 1289, 1331-32 (1976); Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions
Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DuKE L.J. 573, 602-08.
67. 445 U.S. at 408.
68. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined in Justice
Powelrs dissent.
69. 445 U.S. at 409 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1981
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personal stake requirement as a constitutional requirement 7 demand-
ing a non-frivolous showing of controversy or threatened injury at the
hands of the adversary.7 According to the dissenter, neither the prac-
tical importance of review7 2 nor the public interest can replace the
necessary individual interest in the outcome of the litigation.7 3
Second, Justice Powell pointed out that article III contains no excep-
tion for class actions and that the class must be certified before the
live interests of unnamed but identifiable class members may supply
the personal stake required by article III1 . Justice Powell rejected the
majority's use of precedent to demonstrate the application of flexible
mootness in class action litigation. In his view, Sosna was simply an
acknowledgement that class certification gives legal recognition to ad-
ditional adverse parties.75 The dissenter also contended that Gerstein
simply involved a claim that was capable of repetition yet evading
review; it did not suggest that a personal stake in the outcome was un-
necessary.8 Conceding that McDonald and Roper sanction some ap-
peals from class certification denial notwithstanding satisfaction of the
class representative's claim on the merits, the dissent maintained that
McDonald held only that a putative class member may intervene
within the statutory time limit to appeal the certification ruling and
that Roper held that article III was satisfied by the named plaintiffs'
personal stake in sharing anticipated litigation costs. 7 Justice Powell
pointed out that the cases labelled by majority as "less flexible"78 apply
settled principles of article III jurisprudence and cannot be distinguished
from the instant case.7 9
70. Id The dissent viewed the question as one of the power of a federal court to
entertain jurisdiction. Neither practical importance nor public interest, in the dissent's
opinion, could satsify article III limitations on the power of a federal court. Id. at 410-12.
(Powell, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 412 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
72. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 401 n.9; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36
(1974); United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920).
73. 445 U.S. at 412 (Powell, J., dissenting). See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
316 (1974) (per curiam); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S..40, 53-58 (1968).
74. 445 U.S. at 413 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747, 755-56 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S..at 399-402.
75. 445 U.S. at 415 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent described certification as
judicial recognition of the injured class, and as a method to identify the class. In turn, cer-
tification sharpens the class' interest in the outcome because thereafter they will be
bound by the outcome. Id. at 415 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 415 (Powell, J., dissenting). See 420 U.S. at 110 n.11.
77. Id. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting).
78. See 445 U.S. at 400 n.7.
79. Id. at 418 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that Board of School
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam), held that faulty certification
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Third, the dissenting Justice disagreed with the majority's view
that a party who brings a class action presents two separate claims.
He noted that the majority did not identify any injury that may be
redressed by, or any benefit that may accrue from, a favorable ruling
on a class certification question."1 Maintaining that neither rule 2382 nor
the private attorney general concept83 can satisfy article III, the dis-
sent noted that the majority could cite no precedent to support its con-
crete adverseness test as a basis for establishing jurisdiction." Justice
Powell also rejected the majority's reasoning that a departure from
precedent is compelled because a personal stake in the outcome in the
traditional sense cannot be found. He maintained that an attempt to
identify a personal stake in ancillary class certification issues must
often end in frustration because such procedural devices generally
have no value apart from facilitating a resolution of the merits of the
claim.5 The dissent concluded that rule 23 cannot provide a plaintiff
when none is present.8
Prior to Geraghty, the federal circuits differed in their response to
class actions where a named plaintiff's individual claim on the merits
expired prior to certification of a class. A minority of the courts found
that a viable controversy still exists with respect to procuring
classwide relief. 7 However, a majority of the courts that reached the
issue concluded that an improperly certified class or an uncertified
class cannot succeed to the adversary position formerly held by a
plaintiff with an expired claim. Therefore, absent facts bringing the ac-
prevented the class from acquiring separate legal status and therefore article III required
that the action be dismissed as moot. And, this same conclusion was reached in Pasadena
City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), but the action was saved from mootness
by a timely intervention. The dissent also pointed out that Weinstein v. Bradford, 423
U.S. 147 (1975) (per curiam), held that the named plaintiff's release from prison after
denial of class certification rendered the case moot. In summary, the dissent maintained
that these cases demonstrate that no one has a personal stake in obtaining relief for third
parties. 445 U.S. at 418-19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
80. 445 U.S. at 419-20 (Powell, J., dissenting).
81. IM at 420 (Powell, J., disssenting).
82. The dissent pointed out that FED. R. CIV. P. 82 provides that a rule of procedure
"shall not be construed to extend ... the jurisdiction of the United States district courts."
445 U.S. at 421 (Powell, J., dissenting).
83. The dissent reasoned that the private attorney general concept serves only to
permit litigation by a party who has a stake of his own but who otherwise might be
barred by prudential rules. I&
84. Id. at 421 (Powell, J., dissenting).
85. Id at 422 (Powell, J., dissenting).
86. Id at 423-24 (Powell, J., dissenting).
87. See Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978), affd sub nom. Deposit
Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1979); Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578
F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1978).
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tion within the exception announced in Sosna v. Iowa," the majority of
the courts held such cases to be moot.89
In Sosna the Supreme Court confronted the issue posed by the
mooting of the named plaintiffs claim after certification of a class.?
The Court reasoned that upon certification the class acquires a
separate legal status with interests apart from those of the named
plaintiff.9' Therefore, the class itself, regardless of the mootness of the
named plaintiffs claim, is able to satisfy the case or controversy re-
quirement of article III and maintain the suit where the issue evades
review by a single challenger.92 The Sosna Court also emphasized that,
in addition to satisfying the requirements of article III, the standards
of rule 23 must be met. The Court maintained that it was unlikely that
the interests of the class would conflict with the interests of the named
plaintiff and thus their interests would be competently protected at all
levels of the proceedings.' The Sosna Court explained that as long as a
controversy exists between either a named plaintiff or a member of
the certified class and the defendant, a court may hear the case.9 Dic-
tum in Sosna suggested that where a named plaintiffs claim may
reasonably be expected to expire prior to a court's reaching the issue
of class certification, the certification, if subsequently granted, may
relate back to the time of the filing of the complaint.95
Decisions by the Court subsequent to Sosna have provided a confus-
ing array of principles." The Court in Gerstein v. Pugh applied the
relation-back doctrine suggested in Sosna because the issue was
capable of repetition yet evading review. In Gerstein the Court found
that a class of pretrial detainees could be certified after the named
plaintiffs were released. 97 The Court reasoned that because pretrial
detention is in its nature temporary, and because the individual and
88. 419 U.S. at 402 n.11.
89. See Kuahula v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 557 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977); Inmates
v. Sheriff Owens, 561 F.2d 560 (4th Cir. 1977); Winokur v. Bell Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n,
560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978); Lasky v. Quinlan, 558 F.2d
1133 (2d Cir. 1977); Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1049 (1977).
90. 419 U.S. at 398-99.
91. Id. at 399.
92. Id. at 399-400. The Sosna Court stated that although state officials would not seek
to enforce again the challenged statute against the named plaintiff, they would enforce it
against other class members. Id. at 400.
93. Id. at 403 and n.13.
94. Id at 402.
95. Id. at 402 n.11.
96. See generally 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.04 (2d ed. 1969 & Supp.
1980-81).
97. 420 U.S. at 110 n.11.
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others similarly situated could suffer repeated deprivations, the claim
is capable of repetition yet evading review. 8 However, in a case decid-
ed the same day as Gerstein, Board of School Commissioners v.
Jacobs,9' the Court refused to apply the relation-back doctrine
recognized in Gerstein. In Jacobs all of the named plaintiffs challeng-
ing regulations governing a high school newspaper had graduated by
the time of oral argument."0 The Court stated that the case was of a
type likely to become moot as to the initially named plaintiffs prior to
appellate review. However, because the class had not been properly
certified, it refused to save the action.'01
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,"12 a Title VII class action,
the Court found that the action was not mooted by the named
plaintiffs loss of personal stake after certification even though the
claim was not capable of repetition yet evading review."' The Court
stated that nothing in Sosna nor Jacobs, holds or intimates that the
issue must be capable of repetition yet evading review for a certified
class's claim to be saved when the named plaintiffs claim becomes
moot."' According to the Franks Court, Sosna holds that mootness
turns on whether a sufficient adversary relationship exists."'
The Court in Kremens v. Bartley refused to uphold an action by a
certified class where the claims of the named plaintiffs were mooted
by a change in law, and where the class had been carved up by
changes in the law." The Court stated that the mere certification of a
class does not require that the merits of the certified class' claim be
98. Id. The Gerstein Court stated that this case was an exception to the Sosna re-
quirement that the named plaintiffs have a personal stake at the time of certification
because it is not certain that any individual would be in pretrial custody long enough for a
district judge to certify the class. The Court also noted that a constant existence of a
class is certain because the representing attorney was a public defender. Id.
99. 420 U.S. 128 (1975).
100. Id. at 129.
101. Id. at 130.
102. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
103. Id. at 752-57.
104. Id. at 754 & n.7. The Court pointed out that the Sosna Court cited with approval
two circuit court Title VII decisions which held that a certified class' claim was not
automatically mooted by the mootness of the named plaintiff's claim in cases not capable
of repetition yet evading review. Id See 419 U.S. 401 n.10 (citing Roberts v. Union Co.,
487 F.2d 387 (6th Cir. 1973); Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973)).
105. 424 U.S. at 755-56. The Franks Court stated that the "capable of repetition yet
evading review" rule is a policy, rather than a purely constitutional consideration. Id. at
756 n.8.
106. 431 U.S. at 131-32. In Kremens, a class action challenging mental commitment
procedures on behalf of all juveniles under 18 years old, subsequent legislation had
granted the juveniles 13 years and older the rights sought, thereby mooting the 18-year-
old named plaintiffs claim. Id at 124-28.
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heard despite the mootness of the named plaintiffs claim." 7 The Court
determined that not only is the issue in Kremens one that will not
evade review, but the existence of a properly certified class is
dubious.'08
The Court in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald held that where the
district court has denied class certification and the individual claims of
the named plaintiffs are dismissed, an intervening class member may
appeal denial after final judgment.0 Eighteen days after the judgment
for the original named plaintiff, a putative member of the class moved
to intervene to appeal the sole issue of the class certification denial."0
The Court reasoned that after the entry of final judgment: the class
certification denial becomes appealable and, therefore, the timeliness
of the intervention must be determined from that time."' In Deposit
Guaranty National Bank v. Roper the Court allowed the named plain-
tiffs to appeal denial of class certification after entry of judgment in
their favor. The Court held that entry of judgment in their favor over
their objections did not moot the named plaintiffs' claim to appeal the
denial of class certification."2
The Geraghty Court was confronted with a named plaintiff without
an individual claim on the merits, seeking no monetary damages, who
would not be affected by injunctive or declaratory relief, 3 and with an
unnamed and unrecognized class whose rights would be affected by
relief. Nevertheless, the Court focused on the named plaintiffs per-
sonal stake in the procedural claim to class certification,"' a claim
which was recognized in the companion case of Roper. 5
In McDonald the Supreme Court suggested that the interests of the
uncertified class influenced its decision to allow an intervention after
final judgment to appeal a denial of certification. The McDonald Court
recognized that because the named plaintiffs did not intend to appeal
the certification denial, the interests of the absent class members
would not be protected without the intervention of another class
member."6 The Court noted that although an action may no longer con-
107. Id. at 130.
108. Id. at 133.
109. 432 U.S. at 391-94.
110. Id. at 389-90.
111. Id. at 394.
112. 445 U.S. at 332-33. See note 52 supra.
113. The majority maintained that "[t]his respondent suffered actual, concrete injury
as a result of the putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would satisfy the formalistic
personal stake requirement if damages were sought." 445 U.S. at 404 n.11. However, the
dissent pointed out that "[i]n the words of his own lawyer, respondent 'can obtain ab-
solutely no additional relief in this case." Id. at 413-14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
114. See id at 421 (Powell, J., dissenting).
115. See Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. at 332-33.
116. 432 U.S. at 392-94. The issue addressed by the Court in McDonald was whether
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tinue as a class action after a negative certification denial, 117 such a denial
does not require that the action be treated as if it were never brought on
behalf of an absent class."' In Geraghty, as in McDonald, the Court sug-
gested that the interests of the uncertified class influenced its decision.
But the Court did not give the uncertified class a legal status separate
from the interests of the named plaintiff. Instead, it examined the per-
sonal stake of the named plaintiff.
The Geraghty Court examined the named plaintiffs personal stake
using a functional analysis."9 Rather than describing what interests a
party must possess, the Court examined the purposes of the personal
stake requirement in the context of class certification claims."' Noting
that the personal stake requirement assures that the dispute is
capable of judicial review, the Court announced a three-part test for
finding a dispute capable of judicial review. Sharply presented issues
in a concrete factual setting, self-interested parties, and vigorous ad-
vocacy were found to be the characteristics of such a dispute.'21 Con-
cluding only that these elements existed with respect to Geraghty,ln
the Court never attempted to explain how Geraghty satisfied these re-
quirements.1n The Court noted that vigorous advocacy was assured
an attempt to intervene after final judgment to appeal the denial of certification was time-
ly under FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). 432 U.S. at 390.
117. Id. at 393. See 28 U.S.C. app. R.23, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966
Amendments. "A negative determination means that the action should be stripped of its
character as a class action.... Although an action thus becomes a nonclass action, the
court may still be receptive to intervention before the decision on the merits... ." Id. at
430.
118. 432 U.S. at 393 (quoting Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43
F.R.D. 452, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1967)). The Court in Philadelphia Electric determined that
because an action must be assumed to be a class action until a contrary determination is
made, notice of a proposed settlement and dismissal must be given to all members of the
class. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 329 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
The dissent in McDonald rejected the majority's assumption that the class action
somehow continued after the district court denied certification. 432 U.S. at 399-400 & n.2.
(Powell, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, Rule 23 and American Pipe & Constr.
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), support the view that the denial of class status converts
the suit to an ordinary nonclass action. 432 U.S. at 399 & n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). See
445 U.S. at 404 n.11. In American Pipe the Court held that the filing of the original class
suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make
timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class ac-
tion status. 414 U.S. at 553.
119. See generally Kane, Standing, Mootness and Federal 2-Balancing Perspec-
tives, 26 BuFFALO L. REv. 83 (1976).
120. 445 U.S. at 402-04.
121. Id. at 403.
122. Id
123. Id. at 420 & n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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because Geraghty continued to vigorously advocate his right to have a
class certified. '24 This reasoning, however, renders the vigorous ad-
vocacy requirement virtually meaningless because anytime a plaintiff
is before the Court the requirement will be met.
Although the Court focused its decision on the named plaintiffs per-
sonal stake at the time of appeal, it also stated that when a class is er-
roneously denied certification, the corrected ruling "relates back" to
the date of the original denial.12 The Court noted that the relation-back
principle is a traditional equitable doctrine and was applied to class ac-
tion claims in Gerstein.12 Gerstein is distinguishable from Geraghty,
however, because the claim in Gerstein was determined to be capable
of repetition yet evading review, providing the Gerstein Court with an
exception to mootness on which it could base its decision.' = The
Geraghty Court's use of the relation-back doctrine without the issue
being capable of repetition yet evading review implies that the named
plaintiff's personal stake at the time of the denial of certification is suf-
ficient to prevent mootness of the appeal because the corrected ruling
relates back to the time of the denial. However, this reasoning is in-
congruent with the Geraghty Court's own recognition that the re-
quisite personal interest must continue through the litigation.
1 28
It is unclear exactly where the Geraghty Court found the requisite
personal stake. Although the Court's decision recognizes and protects
the interests of the uncertified class, the Court does not afford the
uncertified class legal status to appeal denials of certification. Instead,
using two fictions, it finds a personal stake in the named plaintiff: the
personal stake of a named plaintiff in a procedural claim to class cer-
tification and the relation-back of the corrected certification ruling to
the time of the original denial. Although the Court achieved an
equitable result, its strained interpretation of article III has added
more confusion to the precedent in this already murky area of constitu-
tional law.2
Thomas F. Smida
124. Id. at 404.
125. Id. at 404 n.11.
126. Id
127. See note 98 and text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
128. See 445 U.S. at 397; id. at 411 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10
(1974)).
129. See 445 U.S. at 422 & n.18 (Powell, J. dissenting); 13 C. WRIGHT, A.R. MILLER, E.
CHOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3533 (Bd. Supp. 1980). Wright suggests that
the unfortunate results of the Court's constitutional focus may be that rulemakers and the
legislature will be thwarted in seeking better solutions to mootness and other class action
problems, strained interpretations of article HI will spread to other settings, and new in-
terpretations of standing to pursue procedural entitlements will result. Id.
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